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Abstract
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indif-
ference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered). We prove that, in an
instance where indi!erence takes the form of ties, the set of strongly stable matchings forms a
distributive lattice. However, we show that this lattice structure may be absent if indi!erence is
in the form of arbitrary partial orders. Also, for a given stable marriage instance with ties, we
characterise strongly stable matchings in terms of perfect matchings in bipartite graphs. Finally,
we brie2y outline an alternative proof of the known result that, in a stable marriage instance
with indi!erence in the form of arbitrary partial orders, the set of super-stable matchings forms
a distributive lattice. ? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The classical stable marriage problem (SM) and its many variants have been widely
studied in the literature [10,5,14]. An instance I of SM involves n men and n women,
each of whom ranks all n members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference.
A matching is a one–one correspondence between the men and women in I . We say
that a (man, woman) pair (x; y) is a blocking pair for M if x prefers y to pM (x),
and y prefers x to pM (y), where pM (q) denotes q’s partner in M , for any person q
in I . A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable. It is known that
every instance of SM admits at least one stable matching [3], and in general there
may be many [7]. Moreover, the set of stable matchings for a given instance of SM
1 This work was carried out whilst the author was supported by grant number GR=M13329 from the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
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forms a Cnite distributive lattice under a natural relation of dominance, denoted 4
(Knuth [10] attributes this result to John Conway). One stable matching M dominates
another stable matching M ′ if every man has at least as good a partner in M as he
has in M ′. The man-oriented Gale=Shapley algorithm [3] Cnds, in O(n2) time, the top
element of this lattice, called the man-optimal stable matching. This is the unique stable
matching in which each man has his best possible partner (and each woman her worst)
among all stable matchings. Similarly, by considering the woman-oriented version of
this algorithm, we may Cnd the bottom element of the lattice, the woman-optimal stable
matching.
The exploitation of this lattice structure has led to the formulation of eHcient algo-
rithms for a number of problems associated with SM, for example Cnding all stable
pairs (i.e., determining, for each man m and woman w, whether m and w are partners
in some stable matching) [4], generating all stable matchings [4], Cnding a so-called
egalitarian stable matching [8] and Cnding a so-called minimum regret stable match-
ing [4], 2 and plays a key role in establishing the #P-completeness of the problem
of counting stable matchings [7]. Many of these problems arise naturally in practical
applications such as large-scale centralised matching schemes. Perhaps the largest and
best-known of these schemes is the National Resident Matching Program in the US,
which administers the annual assignment of graduating medical students to hospital
posts, and employs an extension of the Gale=Shapley algorithm for SM [13].
A natural generalisation of SM arises when each person need not rank all members
of the opposite sex in strict order. It is possible that some of those involved might
be indi!erent among certain members of the opposite sex, so that preference lists may
be partially ordered. We use SMP to stand for this variant of SM, and in such a
setting, it may be convenient to refer to a person’s (partially ordered) preference list
as his=her preference poset. The restriction of SMP in which the indi!erence takes
the form of ties in the preference posets (i.e. each preference poset is a weak order
[1]) is denoted by SMT. If a person q precedes a person r in a person p’s preference
poset, then we say that p strictly prefers q to r; if q and r are incomparable in p’s
preference poset, then we say that p is indi0erent between them. Irving [6] formulates
three possible deCnitions for stability for SMP. A matching M is weakly stable if there
is no couple (x; y), each of whom strictly prefers the other to his=her partner in M .
Also, a matching M is strongly stable if there is no couple (x; y) such that x strictly
prefers y to his=her partner in M , and y either strictly prefers x to his=her partner in
M or is indi!erent between them. Finally, a matching M is super-stable if there is no
couple (x; y), each of whom either strictly prefers the other to his=her partner in M or
is indi!erent between them. Clearly a super-stable matching is strongly stable, and a
strongly stable matching is weakly stable. The deCnition of a blocking pair for each of
2 The egalitarian and minimum regret stable matching problems may be deCned as follows. Given an
instance I of SM and a stable matching M in I , the cost of M for a man m is the ranking of pM (m) in m’s
preference list. The cost of M for a woman is deCned similarly. The egalitarian stable matching problem
is to Cnd a stable matching M in I such that the total cost of M summed over all men and women is
minimised. The minimum regret stable matching problem is to Cnd a stable matching M in I such that the
maximum cost of M taken over all men and women is minimised.
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these three stability criteria is analogous to that for SM, and henceforth, the particular
stability criterion to which the term applies should be clear from the context.
In practical situations, it is arguable that strong stability is the most appropriate
stability deCnition. For, there appears to be no real incentive for a man or woman to
form a blocking pair of a matching if each is indi!erent between the other and his=her
partner in the matching. Thus there is a sense in which the super-stability criterion is
too extreme. However, there is also a sense in which the weak stability criterion is too
weak: a man m who strictly prefers a woman w to his partner in a matching might
o!er a bribe to w if she is indi!erent between m and her partner in the matching, to try
to tempt w into exchanging her partner for m. Clearly the weak stability of a matching
cannot exclude blocking pairs that may arise from this practical case; however the
strong stability deCnition does. The latter stability criterion will be the main focus of
this paper.
On the other hand, an example context in which super-stability is relevant is when
there is uncertainty in the preference lists. Suppose that, in a stable marriage instance,
we wish to Cnd a stable matching (in the classical sense), but for some or all of the
participants we have only partial information regarding preferences. In general, each
preference ‘list’ may be expressable only as a partial order, and the particular linear
extension that represents a participant’s true preferences is unknown. It is not diHcult
to see that a matching M in an instance I of SMP is super-stable if and only if M is
stable in every instance of SMT obtained from I by forming linear extensions of the
preference posets in I . Therefore a super-stable matching is one that is stable no matter
which linear extensions of the various preference posets represent the true preferences.
Also, in practice, ties seem to be the most natural form of indi!erence. For, if a
man is indi!erent between one woman w1 and another woman w2, and he is also
indi!erent between w2 and a third woman w3, then it is reasonable to assume that
he is indi!erent between w1 and w3 (i.e., indi!erence is ‘transitive’). Nevertheless, in
this paper our standard deCnition of indi!erence allows a partially ordered list for full
structural generality, since partially ordered preference lists are the natural relaxation
of totally ordered lists.
For a given instance I of SMP, the existence of a weakly stable matching is guar-
anteed: by resolving the indi!erence in I arbitrarily (i.e. by forming a linear extension
of each preference poset), we obtain an instance I ′ of SM, and it is clear that a sta-
ble matching in I ′ is weakly stable in I . (Thus a weakly stable matching for I may
be found in O(n2) time, using the Gale=Shapley algorithm.) On the other hand, it is
straightforward to construct instances of SMT which admit no strongly stable match-
ing and=or no super-stable matching; see [6] for further details. However, Irving [6]
presents O(n4) and O(n2) algorithms for respectively determining whether a strongly
stable matching and=or a super-stable matching exists in a given instance of SMP, and
in each case, if such a matching does exist, the appropriate algorithm constructs one.
It is known that, for a given instance of SMP, the set of super-stable matchings
forms a Cnite distributive lattice [15]. However, in the case of weak stability, this
structure is absent (under the ‘usual’ deCnitions of meet and join—c.f. [5, p. 20]) even
for SMT: there is an instance I of SMT, containing three men, namely m1; m2; m3, and
170 D.F. Manlove /Discrete Applied Mathematics 122 (2002) 167–181
Fig. 1. An instance of SMT with no man-optimal weakly stable matching.
three women, namely w1; w2; w3, which admits no man-optimal weakly stable matching.
This example, due to Roth [13], is reproduced in Fig. 1 (in a preference list, persons
within parentheses are tied); the matchings M1={(m1; w1); (m2; w3); (m3; w2)} and M2=
{(m1; w2); (m2; w1); (m3; w3)} are the two unique weakly stable matchings in I . Since
man m1 has his Crst-choice partner in M1 and his second-choice partner in M2, whereas
man m2 has his second-choice partner in M1 and his Crst-choice partner in M2, then
no man-optimal weakly stable matching in I exists. However, the structure of the set
of matchings that are stable with respect to the remaining stability criterion, namely
strong stability, has remained open until now.
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that, despite an apparent lack
of symmetry in the strong stability deCnition, strongly stable matchings in an SMT
instance nevertheless give rise to a Cnite distributive lattice. This result, presented in
Section 2, is obtained by deCning an equivalence relation ∼ on the set of strongly
stable matchings for a given SMT instance; it is the set of equivalence classes under
∼ which forms the distributive lattice under a dominance relation closely related to 4.
Hence there is convincing evidence that the problems mentioned previously for SM
[4,8] are also polynomial-time solvable for SMT under strong stability. 3
In Section 3, we give a characterisation of the strongly stable matchings in a given
equivalence class in terms of perfect matchings of a suitably deCned bipartite graph.
One use of this representation is to demonstrate how to generate eHciently the strongly
stable matchings in a given equivalence class.
The lattice structure for strong stability in an SMT instance does not carry over to
SMP: in Section 4, we construct an example instance of SMP in which the set of
strongly stable matchings does not form a lattice.
We also consider super-stable matchings brie2y, in Section 5. As previously men-
tioned, it has been shown that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMP instance
I forms a Cnite distributive lattice [15]. The result is established by noting that there
is a set I of instances of SM such that I ′ ∈I if and only if I ′ may be obtained from
I by resolving the indi!erence in I in some way; as previously noted, a matching M
is super-stable in I if and only if M is stable in every member of I. Thus the set
3 For the egalitarian and minimum regret stable matching problems, the cost of a matching in an instance
of SMP may be deCned as follows. For a given person q, assume that ≺q denotes q’s preference poset,
where r ≺q s if and only if q strictly prefers r to s. The cost of a matching M for q is 1 plus the number
of predecessors in ≺q of pM (q).
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of super-stable matchings in I is equal to
⋂
I ′∈I S(I
′), where S(I ′) denotes the set
of stable matchings in the instance I ′ of SM. But each set S(I ′) forms a distributive
lattice, and since the intersection of distributive lattices is also a distributive lattice, the
result follows.
In this paper, we outline an alternative approach which builds on results from Section 2
and leads to the same conclusion, but which avoids using the above intersection argu-
ment, and which, we feel, provides a more intuitive picture of the structure of the set
of super-stable matchings in a given SMP instance. 4
Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Strongly stable matchings form a distributive lattice
In this section, we show that the set of strongly stable matchings for an instance of
SMT gives rise to a Cnite distributive lattice. Throughout this section, certain results
are proved for SMP (rather than SMT) for greater generality, and also with a view to
their exploitation in Section 5.
We begin with a deCnition which will be useful on a number of occasions henceforth.
Denition 1. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings in I . Construct an edge-coloured bipartite graph; denoted by M ⊕M ′; as follows:
form a vertex for each person in I ; and join any two vertices by a red (resp. blue)
edge if the corresponding people are matched in M but not M ′ (resp. M ′ but not M).
It is clear that the connected components of any such graph M ⊕ M ′ are cycles,
since everybody is matched in each of M;M ′.
Our Crst result states that if some person p has di!erent partners in two strongly
stable matchings M;M ′, then there is an important structural relationship between M
and M ′.
Lemma 2. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings in I . Suppose that; for any person p in I; (p; q)∈M and (p; q′)∈M ′; where
q = q′; 5 and p strictly prefers q′ to q or is indi0erent between them. Then there is
a cycle in M ⊕ M ′, comprising alternating (man, woman) and (woman, man) pairs
involving p; q and q′ as follows: for some r ¿ 1, there are r people p1; : : : ; pr in I ,
all of the same sex, and r people q1; : : : ; qr in I , all of the opposite sex, such that
(1) p1 = p, q1 = q and q2 = q′.
(2) (pi; qi)∈M (16 i6 r) and (pi; qi+1)∈M ′ (16 i6 r).
4 We remark that the structural results presented in Sections 2, 3 and 5 may be generalised to the case
that each person may declare certain members of the opposite sex as being unacceptable (in other words,
he or she would rather be unmatched than be matched with such a person). The details are omitted from
this paper.
5 In this paper, we follow the convention that p is indi!erent between q and q′ includes the possibility
that q = q′.
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(3) Case (i):p is indi0erent between q′ and q implies that (a) pi is indi0erent between
qi+1 and qi (16i6r), and (b) qi is indi0erent between pi and pi−1 (16i6r).
Case (ii): p strictly prefers q′ to q implies that (a) pi strictly prefers qi+1 to
qi (16 i6 r), and (b) qi strictly prefers pi to pi−1 (16 i6 r),
where p0 = pr; pr+1 = p1 and qr+1 = q1.
Proof. Consider M ⊕M ′ as deCned in DeCnition 1. In this graph; the vertices p; q; q′
are all in the same connected component G′. We claim that there is a sequence 〈pj〉j¿1
of people in G′; all of the same sex; and a sequence 〈qj〉j¿1 of people in G′; all of
the opposite sex; such that; for each i¿ 1;
(a) {pi; qi} is a red edge and {pi; qi+1} is a blue edge.
(b) pi strictly prefers qi+1 to qi; or is indi!erent between them.
We prove the claim by induction on i. The base case i=1 clearly holds with p1 =p;
q1=q and q2=q′. For an induction step; suppose that some k¿ 1 is given; and assume
that the claim is true for i=k. We show that the claim holds for i=k+1. Person qk+1
is incident to a red edge; {pk+1; qk+1} say; such that qk+1 strictly prefers pk+1 to pk
or is indi!erent between them; for otherwise (pk; qk+1) blocks M . Also person pk+1 is
incident to a blue edge; {pk+1; qk+2} say; such that pk+1 strictly prefers qk+2 to qk+1
or is indi!erent between them; for otherwise (pk+1; qk+1) blocks M ′. This completes
the inductive step.
Since G′ is a cycle, qr+1 = q, pr+1 = p and qr+2 = q′, for some r ¿ 1. Also,
note that for each i¿ 2, qi strictly prefers pi to pi−1, or is indi!erent between
them, for otherwise (pi−1; qi) blocks M . The remainder of the proof is split into two
cases.
Case (i): p is indi!erent between q′ and q. Then a similar induction to the above
(swapping the colours red and blue, and interpreting the indices of each pi, qj appro-
priately) establishes that, for each i¿ 1, pi strictly prefers qi to qi+1 or is indi!erent
between them, and qi strictly prefers pi−1 to pi or is indi!erent between them. Hence
p1; : : : ; pr and q1; : : : ; qr satisfy the required properties.
Case (ii): p strictly prefers q′ to q. Then the fact that p1; : : : ; pr and q1; : : : ; qr
satisfy the required properties may be established by considering the argument from
the start of the proof up to Case (i), and removing all occurrences of the phrase “or
is indi!erent between them”.
The concepts of strict preference and indi!erence may be deCned between matchings,
as well as between men and women, as follows. Let M;M ′ be any matchings in I ,
and let q be any person in I . We say that q strictly prefers M to M ′ if q strictly
prefers pM (q) to pM ′(q). Also, we say that q is indi0erent between M and M ′ if q
is indi!erent between pM (q) and pM ′(q).
Lemma 2 leads to the following theorem, which plays an important role in estab-
lishing the lattice structure.
Theorem 3. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable
matchings in I . Suppose that m and w are partners in M but not in M ′. Then either
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(1) one of m;w strictly prefers M to M ′; and the other strictly prefers M ′ to M; or
(2) both m and w are indi0erent between M and M ′.
Proof. By Case (i) of Lemma 2; m is indi!erent between M and M ′ if and only if
w is indi!erent between M and M ′. Now suppose that m strictly prefers M to M ′. If
w strictly prefers M to M ′; then (m;w) blocks M ′. Hence; since w is not indi!erent
between M and M ′; w strictly prefers M ′ to M . Finally; suppose that m strictly prefers
M ′ to M . Then by Case (ii) of Lemma 2; w strictly prefers M to M ′.
We proceed with the deCnition of the equivalence relation that will be central to our
construction of the lattice structure involving strongly stable matchings.
Denition 4. Let M be the set of strongly stable matchings for a given SMT instance
I . DeCne an equivalence relation ∼ onM as follows. For two strongly stable matchings
M;M ′ ∈M; M ∼ M ′ if and only if each man is indi!erent between M and M ′. Denote
by C the set of equivalence classes of M under ∼; and denote by [M ] the equivalence
class containing M; for M ∈M.
Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation, for indi!erence is transitive in an instance
of SMT. However, the transitivity of indi!erence cannot be guaranteed in an arbi-
trary SMP instance (we see the consequences of this in Section 4). DeCnition 4
leads to the following proposition, whose proof is immediate from the strong stability
deCnition:
Proposition 5. Let I be an instance of SMT; and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable
matchings in I . Then M ∼ M ′ implies that each woman in I is indi0erent between
M and M ′; where ∼ is as de5ned in De5nition 4.
Recall from Section 1 the dominance partial order deCned on the set of stable match-
ings in an SM instance, where one stable matching M dominates another, M ′, if every
man has at least as good a partner in M as he has in M ′. We now give a formal
deCnition of this partial order deCned on strongly stable matchings.
Denition 6. Let I be an instance of SMP and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings. Then M dominates M ′; written M 4 M ′; if each man either strictly prefers M
to M ′; or is indi!erent between them.
We may extend 4 to a partial order 4∗ deCned on equivalence classes as follows.
Denition 7. Let I be an instance of SMT and let C be as deCned in DeCnition 4. De-
Cne a partial order 4∗ on C as follows: for any two equivalence classes [M ]; [M ′]∈C;
[M ] 4∗ [M ′] if and only if M 4 M ′; where 4 is as deCned in DeCnition 6.
Note that the deCnition of (C;4∗) is independent of the particular choices of repre-
sentatives of the equivalence classes [M ] and [M ′]: if M 4 M ′, then P 4 P′ for any
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P ∈ [M ] and P′ ∈ [M ′]. Also, observe that (C;4∗) is a partial order, for, given any
two strongly stable matchings M;M ′, M ∼ M ′ if and only if M 4 M ′ and M ′ 4 M .
We aim to show that (C;4∗) is a Cnite distributive lattice.
In order to establish the existence of a lattice structure, we require to deCne the meet
and the join of two equivalence classes. To this end, we make the following deCnition:
given two strongly stable matchings M;M ′ in an SMP instance I , let Uin(M;M ′) be the
set of men in I who are indi!erent between M and M ′ (note that possibly Uin(M;M ′)=
∅.) Also, by Case (i) of Lemma 2, there is a set of women Win(M;M ′) such that
|Win(M;M ′)| = |Uin(M;M ′)| and each woman in Win(M;M ′) is indi!erent between
M and M ′. Clearly, for every m∈Uin(M;M ′), {pM (m); pM ′(m)} ⊆ Win(M;M ′), and
similarly, for every w∈Win(M;M ′), {pM (w); pM ′(w)} ⊆ Uin(M;M ′).
The following result will be of use in our formulation of a meet operation between
two equivalence classes.
Lemma 8. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings in I . Let M∗ be a set of (man; woman) pairs de5ned as follows: for each man
m∈Uin(M;M ′); m has in M∗ the same partner as in M; and for each man m ∈
Uin(M;M ′); m has in M∗ the better of his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a
strongly stable matching.
Proof. Firstly; we show that M∗ is a matching. Suppose that men m and m′ both
have some woman w as their partner in M∗. Without loss of generality; suppose that
(m;w)∈M and (m′; w)∈M ′; then m strictly prefers M to M ′ or is indi!erent between
them; and m′ strictly prefers M ′ to M . Theorem 3 applied to the pair (m;w) implies
that w strictly prefers M ′ to M or is indi!erent between them. But Theorem 3 applied
to the pair (m′; w) implies that w strictly prefers M to M ′; a contradiction. Hence M∗
is indeed a matching.
Now suppose that M∗ is blocked by some pair (m;w). Suppose Crstly that m strictly
prefers w to pM∗(m). Then w strictly prefers m to pM∗(w) or is indi!erent be-
tween them. Also, m strictly prefers w to both pM (m) and pM ′(m). If pM∗(w) =
pM (w) then (m;w) blocks M , and if pM∗(w) = pM ′(w) then (m;w) blocks M ′. But
pM∗(w)∈{pM (w); pM ′(w)}, so we reach a contradiction.
Hence m is indi!erent between w and pM∗(m). Thus w strictly prefers m to pM∗(w).
Also, m strictly prefers w to pM (m) or is indi!erent between them, and m strictly
prefers w to pM ′(m) or is indi!erent between them. If pM∗(w) = pM (w) then (m;w)
blocks M , and if pM∗(w) =pM ′(w) then (m;w) blocks M ′. Again pM∗(w)∈{pM (w);
pM ′(w)}, so we have a contradiction. Hence M∗ is strongly stable.
We denote by M ∧ M ′ the set of (man, woman) pairs in which each man m∈
Uin(M;M ′) receives the same partner as in M , and each man m ∈ Uin(M;M ′) receives
the better of his partners in M and M ′; by Lemma 8, M ∧ M ′ is a strongly stable
matching. Note that it is not the case that, in general, M ∧M ′ =M ′ ∧M .
We now present a result along the same lines as Lemma 8, which will be of use in
our deCnition of a join operation between two equivalence classes.
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Lemma 9. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings in I . Let M∗ be a set of (man; woman) pairs de5ned as follows: for each man
m∈Uin(M;M ′); m has in M∗ the same partner as in M; and for each man m ∈
Uin(M;M ′); m has in M∗ the poorer of his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a
strongly stable matching.
Proof. Clearly each woman in Win(M;M ′) has the same partner in M∗ as she has in
M . If each man m ∈ Uin(M;M ′) is given the poorer of his partners in M and M ′; then
by Theorem 3; each woman w ∈ Win(M;M ′) receives the better of her partners in M
and M ′. The remainder of the proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 8;
with the roles of the men and women reversed.
We denote byM∨M ′ the set of (man, woman) pairs in which each man m∈Uin(M;M ′)
receives the same partner as in M , and each man m ∈ Uin(M;M ′) receives the poorer
of his partners in M and M ′; by Lemma 9, M ∨M ′ is a strongly stable matching.
The operations ∧ and ∨ on strongly stable matchings have a number of properties,
as indicated by the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let I be an instance of SMT; and let M be the set of strongly stable
matchings in I . Then; for any X; Y; Z ∈M;
(1) X ∧ X = X
(2) X ∨ X = X
(3) X ∧ Y ∼ Y ∧ X
(4) X ∨ Y ∼ Y ∨ X
(5) X ∧ (Y ∧ Z) = (X ∧ Y ) ∧ Z
(6) X ∨ (Y ∨ Z) = (X ∨ Y ) ∨ Z
(7) X ∧ (Y ∨ Z) = (X ∧ Y ) ∨ (X ∧ Z)
(8) X ∨ (Y ∧ Z) = (X ∨ Y ) ∧ (X ∨ Z)
where ∼ is the equivalence relation on M as de5ned in De5nition 4.
Proof. (1)–(4) are obvious from the deCnitions.
To show (5), let m be any man, let R = X ∧ (Y ∧ Z) and let S = (X ∧ Y ) ∧ Z . If
m is not indi!erent between any pair of X; Y; Z , then it is clear that pR(m) = pS(m).
Suppose that m is indi!erent between X; Y and Z . Then pR(m) = pX (m) = pS(m).
Now suppose that m is indi!erent between two of X; Y; Z only, namely A; B, where
A∈{X; Y} and B∈{Y; Z}, without loss of generality. Let C be such that {A; B; C} =
{X; Y; Z}. If m strictly prefers C to each of A; B, then pR(m) = pC(m) = pS(m). Oth-
erwise, m strictly prefers each of A; B to C, and pR(m) = pA(m) = pS(m).
The proof that (6) holds is similar.
To show (7), let m be any man, let R=X ∧ (Y ∨ Z) and let S = (X ∧ Y )∨ (X ∧ Z).
If m is not indi!erent between any pair of X; Y; Z , then the proof that pR(m) = pS(m)
follows by the corresponding proof in Theorem 1:3:2 of [5].
Now suppose that m is indi!erent between Y and Z only. If m strictly prefers
X to Y , then pR(m) = pX (m) = pS(m). Otherwise, m strictly prefers Y to X , and
pR(m) = pY (m) = pS(m).
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If m is indi!erent between X; Y and Z , or m is indi!erent between X and Y only,
or m is indi!erent between X and Z only, then pR(m) = pX (m) = pS(m).
The proof that (8) holds is similar.
We are now in a position to present our main result of this section.
Theorem 11. Let I be an instance of SMT; and let M be the set of strongly sta-
ble matchings in I . Let C be the set of equivalence classes of M under ∼; and
let 4∗ be the dominance partial order on C; where ∼ and 4∗ are as de5ned in
De5nitions 4 and 7; respectively. Then (C;4∗) forms a 5nite distributive lattice;
with [M ∧ M ′] representing the meet of [M ] and [M ′]; and [M ∨ M ′] the join; for
two equivalence classes [M ]; [M ′]∈C.
Proof. By Lemmas 8 and 9; [M ∧ M ′]∈C and [M ∨ M ′]∈C. Also; by Lemma 8;
M ∧M ′ 4 M and M ∧M ′ 4 M ′; so that [M ∧M ′] 4∗ [M ] and [M ∧M ′] 4∗ [M ′].
Similarly; by Lemma 9; M 4 M ∨M ′ and M ′ 4 M ∨M ′; so that [M ] 4∗ [M ∨M ′]
and [M ′] 4∗ [M ∨M ′].
Now suppose that [M∗] 4∗ [M ] and [M∗] 4∗ [M ′], for any strongly stable matching
M∗. Then M∗ 4 M and M∗ 4 M ′, so that each man has at least as good a partner in
M∗ as he has in each of M and M ′. Hence M∗ 4 M ∧M ′, so that [M∗] 4∗ [M ∧M ′],
and hence [M∧M ′] is the greatest lower bound of [M ] and [M ′]. By a similar argument,
[M ∨M ′] is the least upper bound of [M ] and [M ′]. Hence by Lemma 10, (C;4∗) is
a Cnite distributive lattice.
3. Characterising strongly stable matchings in an equivalence class
In this section, we give a representation of the strongly stable matchings in an
equivalence class in terms of perfect matchings of a bipartite graph. We begin with a
deCnition which will feature in the construction of this graph.
Denition 12. Let I be an instance of SMT. For any persons p; q in I ; not both of the
same sex; let T (p; q) denote the set of people tied with q in p’s preference list.
Note that in the above deCnition, T (p; q) = ∅, since q∈T (p; q). We now deCne the
bipartite graph that forms the basis of our equivalence class representation.
Denition 13. Let I be an instance of SMT; and let M be a strongly stable matching
in I . DeCne the equivalence graph; HM = (V; E); of M as follows: let V = U ∪ W;
where U;W are the sets of men and women in I ; respectively; and
E = {(m;w): w∈T (m;pM (m)) ∧ m∈T (w;pM (w))}:
For a given equivalence class C, the perfect matchings in the corresponding equiv-
alence graph are exactly the strongly stable matchings in C, as the following result
indicates.
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Theorem 14. Let I be an instance of SMT; and let M be a strongly stable matching
in I . Let M ′ be any matching in I . Then M ′ is strongly stable with M ′ ∼ M if and
only if M ′ is a perfect matching in HM ; where ∼ is as de5ned in De5nition 4 and
HM = (V; E) is the equivalence graph of M .
Proof. Suppose that M ′ is strongly stable and M ′ ∼ M . Let (m;w) be any (man; wo-
man) pair in M ′. Then m is indi!erent between w and pM (m); so that w∈T (m;pM (m)).
Also; by Proposition 5; w is indi!erent between m and pM (w); so that m∈T (w;pM (w)).
Hence (m;w)∈E; so that M ′ is a perfect matching in HM .
Conversely suppose that M ′ is a perfect matching in HM . Suppose that some un-
matched (man, woman) pair (m;w) blocks M ′. Now m is indi!erent between pM (m)
and pM ′(m). Also, w is indi!erent between pM (w) and pM ′(w). Hence (m;w) blocks
M , a contradiction. Thus M ′ is strongly stable in I . Clearly M ′ ∼ M .
A consequence of the representation of Theorem 14 is that strongly stable matchings
may be eHciently generated in a given equivalence class. More speciCcally, we now
show that, having found a strongly stable matching M in an SMT instance I of size
n (which may be achieved in O(n4) time [6]), we may generate all of the remaining
strongly stable matchings in [M ] with a delay of O(n2) time per matching.
Corollary 15. Let I be an instance of SMT; and let M be the set of strongly stable
matchings in I . Let C be the set of equivalence classes of M under ∼; where ∼ is as
de5ned in De5nition 4. Then for any [M ]∈C; the strongly stable matchings in [M ]
may be generated e8ciently.
Proof. Let HM be the equivalence graph of M . By Theorem 14; M ′ ∈ [M ] if and only
if M ′ is a perfect matching in HM . The set of perfect matchings in a bipartite graph G
may be generated eHciently [2]: once an initial perfect matching in G has been found
(in this case; such a matching is M); all of the remaining perfect matchings in G may
be generated with a delay of O(n2) time per matching. The whole enumeration process
takes O(n3) space.
The question as to whether this enumeration may be achieved by constructing an ini-
tial strongly stable matching in O(n2) time, and then by generating subsequent strongly
stable matchings with a delay of O(n) time per strongly stable matching, and further-
more by using O(n2) space overall, which are all optimal bounds (and achievable for
stable matchings in an instance of SM [4]), remains open.
4. Strongly stable matchings in an SMP instance
In this section, we construct an instance I of SMP with the property that the strongly
stable matchings in I do not form a lattice (with respect to the meet and join deCni-
tions of Section 2). The instance I contains six men, namely m1; m2; : : : ; m6, and six
women, namely w1; w2; : : : ; w6. The preference posets for each person in I are shown in
Fig. 2 (the symbol ‘: : :’ in a person’s preference poset denotes all remaining people of
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Fig. 2. An instance of SMP with no man-optimal strongly stable matching.
the opposite sex listed in arbitrary strict order at the point where the symbol appears).
Note that each of men m5; m6 is indi!erent between woman w6 and woman wi, for
16 i6 5. Given that the indi!erence in the men’s preference posets does not take the
form of ties, the instance I of SMP is not an instance of SMT.
Now consider the matchings M1={(mi; wi): 16 i6 6} and M2={(m1; w2); (m2; w1);
(m3; w4); (m4; w3); (m5; w6); (m6; w5)}. It may be veriCed that each of M1; M2 is strongly
stable in I . However, each of men m1; m2 has his Crst-choice partner in M1 and his
second-choice partner in M2, whereas each of men m3; m4 has his second-choice partner
in M1 and his Crst-choice partner in M2. Now let M be any strongly stable match-
ing in I . It may be veriCed that (m1; w1)∈M if and only if (m2; w2)∈M , and also
(m3; w4)∈M if and only if (m4; w3)∈M . Suppose, without loss of generality, that
(m1; w1)∈M and (m4; w3)∈M . Then each of m5; m6 must be matched in M with a
partner strictly better than w1; w3, respectively. Since the only such woman is w5 in
each case, no such M exists.
Hence no man-optimal strongly stable matching (or equivalence class) in I exists,
which rules out the possibility of there being a lattice structure for the strongly stable
matchings in I , given the the meet and join deCnitions of Section 2.
Note that in the example I above, indi!erence occurs on both the men’s side and the
women’s side. In general, this is a necessary condition for the lattice structure to be
absent. For, if indi!erence occurs on one side only, then the strong stability criterion
is equivalent to the super-stability criterion, and super-stable matchings in an arbitrary
SMP instance do form a lattice [15].
5. Super-stability
In this section, we brie2y outline an alternative strategy from the one used by
Spieker [15] to show that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMP instance forms
a Cnite distributive lattice. The basis of our method is the following lemma, which
demonstrates that if a person has di!erent partners in two super-stable matchings, then
he=she cannot be indi!erent between them. This useful property of super-stable match-
ings is not stated explicitly in [15].
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Lemma 16. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two super-stable match-
ings in I . Suppose that; for any person p in I; (p; q)∈M and (p; q′)∈M ′; where p
is indi0erent between q and q′. Then q= q′.
Proof. Suppose q = q′. Since M and M ′ are strongly stable; we may invoke Case (i)
of Lemma 2. We then Cnd that (p; q′) blocks M; a contradiction.
LetM be the set of super-stable matchings for a given SMP instance I . Consider 4,
the dominance partial order of DeCnition 6, now deCned on M. The insight into the
structure of super-stable matchings in an SMP instance provided by Lemma 16 allows
us to follow an approach along the lines of that employed in Section 2, in order to
show that (M;4) forms a Cnite distributive lattice. We begin with the analogue of
Theorem 3 for super-stability.
Theorem 17. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two super-stable match-
ings in I . Suppose that m and w are partners in M but not in M ′. Then one of m;w
strictly prefers M to M ′; and the other strictly prefers M ′ to M .
Proof. By Lemma 16; neither m nor w is indi!erent between M and M ′. Hence; as
M;M ′ are both strongly stable; the result follows by Theorem 3.
It is a straightforward matter to modify the proofs of Lemmas 8 and 9 to establish
the super-stability analogues; we omit the details. Thus we have:
Lemma 18. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two super-stable match-
ings in I . Let M∗ be a set of (man; woman) pairs de5ned by giving each man m the
better of his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a super-stable matching.
Lemma 19. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M;M ′ be two super-stable match-
ings in I . Let M∗ be a set of (man; woman) pairs de5ned by giving each man m the
poorer of his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a super-stable matching.
We denote by M ∧M ′ (resp. M ∨M ′) the set of (man, woman) pairs in which each
man receives the better (resp. poorer) of his partners in M and M ′. We are now in a
position to state our main result of this section.
Theorem 20. Let I be an instance of SMP; and let M be the set of super-stable
matchings in I . Then (M;4) forms a 5nite distributive lattice; with M ∧M ′ repre-
senting the meet of M and M ′; and M ∨M ′ the join; for two super-stable matchings
M;M ′ ∈M; where 4 is the dominance partial order of De5nition 6; now de5ned
on M.
Proof. By Lemmas 18 and 19; M ∧M ′ ∈M and M ∨M ′ ∈M. The proof that M ∧M ′
is the greatest lower bound of M and M ′; and M ∨ M ′ is the least upper bound
of M and M ′; is along the same lines as the corresponding part of the proof of
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Theorem 11. Clearly; each of the meet and join operations is idempotent; commuta-
tive and associative. It also follows by Theorem 1:3:2 of [5] that the meet and join
operations distribute over each other. Hence (M;4) is a Cnite distributive lattice.
6. Conclusions and open problems
As mentioned previously, it remains open as to whether the lattice structure for
SMT under strong stability can be exploited so as to yield eHcient algorithms for the
problems of Cnding an egalitarian strongly stable matching, a minimum regret strongly
stable matching and all strongly stable pairs (i.e. determining, for each man m and
woman w, whether m and w are partners in some strongly stable matching) for a
given SMT instance. Although we have suggested a strategy for listing strongly stable
matchings in a given equivalence class under ∼, the general problem of listing all
strongly stable matchings in an SMT instance also remains open. Each of these four
problems is also open for SMP under super-stability, but the existence of a lattice
structure, and Lemma 16 in particular, provides strong evidence that all four problems
are eHciently solvable. On the other hand, the situation for SMP under strong stability
is likely to be di!erent, in view of Section 4. Indeed, the problem of deciding whether
a given instance of SMP admits a strongly stable matching is NP-complete [11].
In the case of weak stability however, the eHcient solvability of three of the afore-
mentioned problems is known to be unlikely. The problems of Cnding an egalitarian
weakly stable matching and a minimum regret weakly stable matching in an SMT
instance I are both NP-hard, and are not approximable within n1−%, for any %¿ 0,
where n is the number of people in I , unless P = NP [9,12]. In addition, the problem
of determining, for a given SMT instance and a given man m and woman w, whether
m and w are partners in some weakly stable matching, is also NP-hard [12]. Each of
these results holds in the restricted case that every tie is of length two, there is at
most one tie per preference list, and the ties occur in the preference lists of one sex
only (these conditions holding simultaneously). Finally, the question as to whether all
weakly stable matchings in a given SMT instance may be generated eHciently (in the
sense described in Section 3) remains open, though we conjecture that the answer will
be in the negative.
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